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Terrorism in Africa: The Nature of the Threat 
A casual reading of major newspapers would leave one with the impression that terrorists are 
running rampant across Africa. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple lawless and stateless 
areas that litter the continent; they supposedly gain recruits from among the starving and 
displaced masses who have been victimized by powerful warlords and governments that are 
fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable 
communities, building militant organizations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers 
from the ranks of the poor Africans.  
This is, to state it mildly, a vast oversimplification of both the nature of terrorist recruitment and 
the terrorist threat in Africa. First of all, organized terrorist groups no not rampantly proliferate 
across the continent. Prior to 2001, there were no designated “foreign terrorist organizations” in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. There have been a number of organizations that area governments label as 
“terrorists,” yet the United States has been hesitant to recognize the groups as such, for the 
understandable reason that in many cases, area governments are labeling opposition groups 
terrorists in order to gain support to combat their opponents.  
Second, these sentiments are an overstatement of the influence of militant Islam across the 
continent, and a misunderstanding of the nature of “terrorism.” Terrorism in Africa is not confined 
to the realm of the radical Islamists, though those are the groups that receive the most attention. 
Of the three Sub-Saharan groups that have found their way onto the “other designated 
organizations” lists maintained by the State Department, only one (Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya, AIAI, of 
Somalia), was Islamist.[1] The other two included the former military of Rwanda (the ex-FAR) and 
a Christian terrorist group in Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). al-Qaeda, obviously on 
the list of designated FTOs, operates in Africa, but is not from Africa.  
Third, the common mantra that “failed states lead to terrorism” is, in fact, belied by geography: the 
designated terrorist organization that do exist and which have attacked Western targets tend to 
organize and operate in the countries with a modicum of law and order, such as South Africa and 
Kenya. Indigenous terrorist organizations (not designated by the United States) have originated 
and continue to operate in both unstable countries such as Somalia and Liberia, but the group are 
more prolific in states that have more advanced infrastructures, such as South Africa, Nigeria and 
Kenya. Without a reliable and secure commercial infrastructure, it becomes difficult to move 
commodities and illicit goods to fund terrorist activities. The largest al-Qaeda network in East 
Africa was uncovered in Kenya, one of the most politically stable countries in the region. In fact, 
to date this cell has been the only direct al-Qaeda group that has been turned up since the 
GWOT began in 2001. Terrorist groups tend to use the “failed” states like Somalia more as 
staging grounds and transit points, rather than places where the groups build long-term 
organizational and financial networks. Even in West Africa, while Hezbollah obtains diamonds 
from conflict zones and stateless areas, terrorists find it necessary to transport them via the 
Lebanese diaspora community that lives in the more politically stable countries.  
Finally, when understanding the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa, it is important to note that 
there are distinct regional variations to the presence and extent of Islamist terrorist networks 
across Africa. The threat in Southern and Central Africa is almost non-existent, and for a clear 
reason: there are relatively few Muslims in Central and Southern Africa (see figure one). In these 
areas, Islamists are attempting to convert Christians to Islam, rather than proliferating radical 
Islamist networks.[2] Islam is much more prevalent in Northern, Eastern and Western Africa, and 
accordingly there are more Islamist groups, both radical and non-radical, in these areas than 
farther south. Therefore, when discussing the terrorist threat and U.S. counterterrorism programs 
in Africa, regional variations in the number of groups, intensity of their activities and the nature of 
the Islamist terrorist threat, are important. 
Figure One: Islam in Africa 
 
Source: United States Institute of Peace. 
In East and West Africa, Islam as a political ideology has capitalized on ethno-national struggles 
to create a potent force. Focusing on West Africa, the U.S. government is concerned with the 
activities of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and a host of localized organizations, most notably the Salafist 
Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC).[3] Tabliqhi Islamic sects, which themselves are nonviolent, 
recruit individuals in a missionary style that focuses on socially isolated young men. From these 
individuals, radical groups then recruit terrorists. For example, John Walker Lindh, the “American 
Taliban” arrested in 2001, had been a member of a Tabliqhi sect before becoming radicalized.  
Radical groups have also been able to capitalize on local struggles for power and influence, as 
with the recruitment of militants from the Tuareg group in Mauritania and Mali. Nigeria has seen 
major increases in sectarian strife and militarized Islam in recent years, further contributing to 
rising concern in the Western and Sahelian regions.[4] Attacks against Western oil companies in 
the Niger Delta, however, come not from Islamist organizations, but from ethnic-nationalist 
movements seeking a more equitable share of oil revenues, to compensate for the environmental 
degradation wreaked by oil exploitation.  
East Africa has attracted special interest from the United States and international community 
because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United States Embassies in 
Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) were bombed, killing a handful of U.S. citizens 
and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. Sudan and Somalia have both served as training 
grounds and transit routes for al-Qaeda, and the agents who attacked the embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania were closely linked to cells in Sudan and Somalia. As recent events in Somalia 
reveal, it is thought that at least two of these individuals are still hiding out in Somalia. In the wake 
of the embassy bombings, an organized al-Qaeda cell was uncovered in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2002, 
one of Kenya’s most popular tourist destinations, Mombasa, experienced two further terrorist 
strikes, this time in the form of coordinated and simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel 
popular with Western tourists and an Israeli-chartered aircraft departing from the Mombasa 
airport.  
Most importantly, East Africa has also been home to both al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. al-
Qaeda’s presence in the eastern region is both direct, with agents operating in several countries, 
as well as indirect, through the creation of satellite organizations and the recruitment of existing 
organizations to al-Qaeda’s cause. Sudan provided both training camps and a source of financial 
support for his organization during the early 1990s. In 1991 the leader of Sudan’s National Islamic 
Front (NIF) government, Hassan al Turabi, invited Osama bin Laden to live in Sudan. During this 
time, bin Laden established multiple businesses in Sudan, many of which he retains, and 
established al-Qaeda training camps in the more remote areas.[5] With the support of the NIF, bin 
Laden created the “Islamic Army Shura,” which he intended to function as a coordinating body for 
a consortium of terrorist groups allied to bin Laden.[6] Groups from Somalia and Eritrea were 
formally associated with Islamic Army Shura, and informal ties were established with groups in 
Uganda and several West African states. al-Qaeda has increased its direct presence in much of 
East Africa during recent years, extending from Sudan in the north to Tanzania, and perhaps 
even into Malawi in the south, which is why the region increasingly figures in U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.[7]  
Despite this permissive environment, the indigenous terrorist threat in much of Africa has not 
been considered a major threat in by the U.S. government, which focuses almost exclusively on 
the threat posed by transnational jihadi organizations originating outside Africa. Yet groups like al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah operate alongside a pervasive network of local groups, some of which are 
affiliated with the transnational organizations, and many of which are not. In fact, the bulk of 
Islamist “terrorist” organizations in East Africa are those that originated in the area and operate 
with a regional agenda. Many of these groups existed before al-Qaeda attempted to organize 
them into a loose hierarchy, and so far these local groups have not become deeply entrenched in 
the al-Qaeda network. The most important obstacle to a closer alliance has been that local 
Islamist groups have a primary loyalty to their clans and ethnic tribes that has not always been 
compatible with al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda.[8] Transnational terrorist organizations like al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah find it difficult to coordinate activities with local groups and have mostly 
given up attempting to organize them into larger associations and networks.[9] The transnational 
groups find the clan-based warfare and seeming anarchy of acephalous societies like Somalia 
difficult terrain in which to recruit and prosper.[10]  
U.S. Counter-Terrorism Initiatives 
While the terrorist threat may not be as extensive as the U.S. government and popular pundits 
claim, it is undeniable that there has been an increase in militant Islamism across the continent in 
recent years. Conflicts in Nigeria, the recent rise of the Islamic Courts Union (also known as the 
Council of Islamic Courts) in Somalia, and the vulnerabilities to recruitment created by pervasive 
conflict zones, attest to the increasing influence that Islamists have on the continent. The U.S. 
has made countering these networks one cornerstones of its foreign policy in Africa, as Letitia 
Lawson described in her contribution to this issue.  
Counter-terrorism programs are complicated by historical and local conditions. Colonially-
bestowed, artificial state borders divide ethnic groups, so that the people on either side of a 
border are often more loyal to their extended family networks than to their central governments. 
Trading and smuggling routes are centuries old, whether they involved the khat (qhat) trade in 
northern Sudan and Somalia or the spice trade along the coast from Zanzibar to Yemen. Porous 
borders and migrant groups make it extremely difficult to keep track of people and the flows of 
people and goods across borders, which can facilitate the transport of goods and commodities 
such as weapons and people (i.e., slaves) that can be traded for revenue. Along the coast of the 
Horn and down into east and central Africa, small trading boat (dhouw) traffic is virtually 
impossible to monitor, adding a maritime dimension to the difficulties in tracking terrorist activities 
and financial patterns. Conditions of poverty and scarcity make individuals vulnerable, and they 
will turn to any source of support, which provides opportunities for militant operatives to infiltrate 
charitable organizations and manipulate their programs. Finally, corrupt governments often 
survive through the same tactics and vulnerabilities that terrorist organizations manipulate, 
complicating U.S. efforts to “clean up” policing, enforce border security, and monitor financial 
transactions.  
Accordingly, counterterrorism efforts operate at several levels: militarily, governmental, and 
societal. Programs take the form of direct security sector assistance, capacity building programs 
and economic assistance, and are overseen by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of 
State (DoS, or State), Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). In this article, security sector assistance primarily refers to 
combined exercises and programs that train foreign militaries and security forces to operate more 
efficiently and professionally, though the Department of Defense also considers humanitarian and 
preventative measures as part of the war on terror.[11] Governance and capacity programs 
include both traditional democratization efforts, which help to inculcate norms of inclusion and 
participation, and governance assistance, which are programs that attempt to train governments, 
both national and local, in how to carry out their activities. State and USAID tend to oversee most 
of these efforts, either directly or through a range of subcontractors. Economic programs include 
traditional development assistance and the more recent wave of “post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization” programs that have become popular with the U.S. government, undertaken primarily 
by USAID. Because conditions of poverty make people vulnerable to recruitment, in a very broad 
sense, developmental programs also serve counterterrorism goals. Treasury’s activities focus 
mainly on countering terrorist finance, and are the most narrow of the programs.  
Each of these initiatives targets a different aspect of the four “D’s” of fighting terrorism: defeat 
terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish 
the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and defend U.S. citizens and interests at 
home and abroad.[12] Another way to consider these programs is that they attempt to fight the 
supply of terrorists, the demand for terrorist networks, and the ability of terrorist to operate and 
maneuver. In the Department of Defense (DoD), these all a set of programs that are designed to 
combat the problem of “ungoverned spaces,” where “spaces” is not just a geographical 
expression, but also one of authority. An ungoverned space is a “physical or non-physical area 
where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control.”[13] Basically, the 
concept refers to areas where territories are physically uncontrolled or functional policy areas in 
which governments have ceded control, often allowing other organizations to take over the 
provision of services and functions that the government, in traditional terms, should be providing.  
The issue of ungoverned spaces, poor governance capacity, authoritarian regimes and an 
inability to control territories beyond those in the capital cities is not new in Africa. The novel 
element is that it is the Department of Defense that is now taking up these issues, rather than 
them being relegated to issues of than issues of humanitarian assistance and under-funded 
programs farmed out by USAID. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) for 
Africa Theresa Whelan, there has been a paradigm shift in how the DoD views threats and 
strategic interests. Emerging threats, issues of poor human security and poverty and the inability 
of most governments to control their territories (physically as well as in terms of governance) all 
contribute to an environment that is conducive to creating terrorist safe havens and recruiting 
bases. Therefore, the DoD has come to realize that it must take a more proactive approach, 
rather than just reacting to situations that have degenerated to near anarchy.[14]  
The DoD has adopted the perspective, Whelan argues, that countering terrorism will never 
succeed unless it is part of a broader approach that focuses on the fundamental problems that 
prevent African governments from effectively controlling their territories, ruling capably and 
accountably, and in conditions of dire poverty. This paradigm shift also comes with the realization 
that the DoD is only one small part of a larger set of agencies that are necessary to conduct 
programs that will address these concerns, and that a multi-agency approach with cooperation 
between various U.S. and international agencies is the only way to address the issues.[15]  
The following discussion focuses on U.S. foreign policy objectives in two of the fronts in the effort 
to counterterrorism: security assistance and capacity building, and counter-terrorist finance 
measures. Broadly construed, programs to promote economic development and governance 
assistance could also be considered counterterrorism measures to the extent that they alleviate 
conditions that lead people vulnerable to recruitment. Because the counterterrorism is not their 
primary focus, however, and because these types of programs are not explicitly security-focused, 
I am not including them in the article. 
Security Sector Assistance Programs 
Many of the United States' counterterrorism (CT) efforts are oriented towards military assistance 
and surveillance, and security building. On a continental scale, the main program is the Global 
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), whose African face is the African Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). GPOI aims to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010, a 
“majority” of whom are meant to be African.[16] In 2005, GPOI spent $35.6 million directly on 
Africa training and support to its Africa headquarters, out of a total budget of $96.7 million. 
Another $26 million went towards equipment, much of which found its way to Africa. 
ACOTA is run by the State Department, which in turn employs contractors to conduct the actual 
training. U.S. Military participation is in a supportive, rather than central role in ACOTA 
programs.[17] GPOI and ACOTA focus on creating regional peacekeeping forces, training 
battalions and companies from approximately thirteen African countries. While not strictly focused 
on combating terrorism, ACOTA warrants mention in this article because one of the main 
components in U.S. strategy is to lesson ungoverned spaces and reduce support for terrorist 
organizations in the first place. A lack of human security and conditions of poverty, both of which 
are caused by civil wars and insurgencies, are considered some of the primary reasons that 
people may turn towards radical organizations, and the lack of government control in these areas 
perpetuates the problem of vast ungoverned spaces. Therefore, the Department of Defense 
considers the ACOTA as a supportive program in the war on terror, even if it is not explicitly 
countering terrorism.  
Table 1: GPOI FY2005 Spending as of August 2005. 
 
Source: Serafino, 8. 
Turning to the explicit counterterrorism programs that focus on military assistance, there are the 
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Joint Task force AZTEK SILENCE, and the 
East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). The Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) falls within this category, though technically it combines security assistance with 
humanitarian programs that aimed to combat terrorism, reduce the conditions that lead to 
terrorism, and win hearts and minds in support of the War on Terror.  
In East Africa, the EACTI and CJTF-HOA provide the base for U.S. counterterrorism programs. 
The key goals of U.S. CT policy in East Africa are containment in Somalia; counterterrorism and 
the promotion of peace and stability in Sudan, and security partnerships with Kenya and 
Ethiopia.[18] Increasing border security, better surveillance of coastal traffic, increased customs 
efficiency and seaport security could all work to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to 
operate and move about the region, particularly in Sudan and Somalia. Established in June 2003 
as a program of the Department of State, the $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative 
(EACTI) provides key states in the Horn of Africa with military training to strengthen coastal, 
border, customs, airport, and seaport security. In addition, the Initiative plans to train law 
enforcement officials in East Africa.”[19] Finally, the program includes assistance for regional 
efforts against terrorist financing and police training, as well as an education program to counter 
extremist influence.[20]  
The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) that has been established in Camp 
Lemonier (formerly the headquarters of the French Foreign Legion) in Djibouti serves as the focal 
point for DoD efforts in the region. CJTF falls under the jurisdiction of the United States Central 
Command (USCENTCOM). On average, the staff of the CJTF numbers around 250, and the 
assigned troops between 1,200-1,800,[21] and the navy often conducts surveillance missions in 
the Red Sea.[22] The “combined” aspect of the CJTF is at the staff level only; there are no non-
US troops assigned to the U.S. command. The CJTF-HOA’s publicly-stated mission to engage in 
“joint and combined training and operations in the CJOA-HOA and AOI to enable Regional 
Nations to defeat Al-Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM) and to obtain coalition support in 
order to diminish underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit and to prevent the re-
emergence of AQAM.”[23]  
To effect this mission, the CJTF-HOA efforts conduct a series of short-term operations that are 
designed facilitate information operations, increase border security, provide counterterrorism 
training, increase coastal security, and foster intelligence sharing. In addition, the CJTF-HOA 
engages in civil-military operations and civil-affairs operations to support the primary activities. In 
these latter activities, the CJTF-HOA conducts goodwill exercises that include bringing U.S. 
military medical and veterinary professionals to various locations in the region to help local 
communities, and using the engineering capabilities of the Army engineers and Navy Seabees to 
dig wells and provide infrastructure to communities. Officially, the CJTF-HOA is not a direct action 
force and does not directly engage terrorists.  
In West Africa, the main programs are the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-
Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). The PSI operated between November 2002 and 
March 2004 with a budget of $7.75 million. It provided Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania with 
assistance to training and equipment to improve their border security and deny the use of their 
sovereign territory to terrorists and criminals. PSI was primarily a military initiative run by 
European Command (EUCOM), and focused on capacity building in the security forces: 
increasing border control capabilities and in each country creating a rapid reaction force to pursue 
terrorists.  
In 2004-2005, the PSI transitioned into the TSCTI, not only increasing funding and the scope of 
activities, but also making it an inter-agency endeavor. TSCTI, officially led by the State 
Department, incorporates the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and USAID. DoD 
performs the security assistance functions through EUCOM, and the military portion of TSCTI is 
called Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). Funding for TSCTI was $16 million 
for 2005, with plans for $30 million in 2006, and $100 million a year for the remaining five years 
until 2011.[24] OEF-TS provides basic training to a rapid reaction company in each country, 
focusing on marksmanship, operational planning, communications, first aid, land navigation, 
communications, and patrolling. In contrast to ACOTA, which focuses on peacekeeping skills and 
non-lethal weapons training, TSCTI focuses on hunting down, capturing or otherwise eliminating 
terrorist groups. U.S. trainers have included both Special Forces and Marine Corps units.[25]  
JTF Aztec Silence was established in December 2003, under the command of U.S. Sixth Fleet 
and operating in Northern Africa. Like the other programs in Africa, the focus is to fight 
transnational terrorism in ungoverned spaces and to build closer alliances between the United 
States and area governments. Aztec Silence focuses on information, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and uses Navy intelligence assets to provide collect and share information 
with partner countries and their militaries.[26]  
In Southern and Central Africa, which rank lowest on the terrorism priorities to the U.S. 
government, the main program is the International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) located in 
Gaborone, Botswana, run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The ILEA trains local law 
enforcement officials in a variety of areas, among them intelligence and operation to track and 
apprehend terrorist groups and illicit activities. The focus of the ILEA is not explicitly 
counterterrorism, but general law enforcement capacity building. Again, as with the ACOTA 
program, to the extent that the issue of ungoverned spaces truly is a viable link to terrorist activity, 
the efforts of the ILEA to train area police forces and establish a more comprehensive rule of law 
in Africa contributes to the War on Terror. Through all of these efforts, the U.S. government aims 
to increase the capacity of African militaries and security forces and to support area governments, 
enabling them to better control their borders, conduct peace support operations and to directly 
track and fight terrorists both within their countries and the region.  
Terrorist Finance Programs  
Programs aimed directly at countering terrorist finance have almost no military components. 
These programs are primarily bilateral and include initiatives managed by the FBI and Treasury 
Department. The FBI’s Terrorist Finance Operations Section (FTOS) runs training sessions on 
combating terrorist finance in regions around the world, yet African participation is minimal and in 
2003, Kenya was the only country to receive this training.[27] The ILEA discussed previously 
figures in the FBI’s arsenal to combat terrorist finance, though its full impact across Africa may be 
limited. Housed in Gaborone, Botswana, the African ILEA primarily serves countries in the 
Southern African region, which limits its impact in strengthening the capacity of East African law 
enforcement agencies. Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda have been invited to send officials 
to Gaborone for training at the ILEA, and the first East Africans graduated a three-month course 
in June 2003.[28] This could indicate that in the future the ILEA will help to strengthen the 
capacity of the East African governments as well. Financial crimes are among the many courses 
taught at the ILEA (the others courses involve, among other subjects, counterterrorism in general, 
anti-corruption, border security, drug enforcement, firearms).  
The Treasury Department, arguably the U.S. agency most directly applicable to the fight against 
terrorist financing, restricts its activities primarily to supporting and liasing with regional 
organizations that fight money laundering and terrorist finance. The Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), a U.S. agency, helps to stand up regional bodies, called FATF-style regional bodies 
(FSRBs) around the world.[29] These regional organizations then attempt to influence the 
governments in their areas to pass and enforce legislation that strengthens the regulation of their 
financial sectors and criminalizes terrorist financing. The Department of Treasury’s involvement is 
limited to advice about creating anti-money laundering regimes, focusing on implementing a set 
of regulations established by the FATF that combat terrorist finance (called the FATF 40 plus the 
special eight recommendations). In Africa, Treasury officials work with the East and Southern 
African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group 
Against Money Laundering (GIABA) of West Africa. These are the two FSRBs in Africa.  
Many of the difficulties that African governments experience with fighting terrorism concern 
capacity limitations (law enforcement agencies that are weak and/or unable to actually track and 
obtain evidence on terrorist financiers and money launderers) and an inability (or unwillingness) 
to tighten security and enforce border controls. The countries that do have anti-money laundering 
legislation are slow to implement the regulations, however, and the entire effort against money 
laundering and other forms of TF involves more than just the creation of AML regimes. 
Enforcement is also key.  
Strengthening law enforcement capacities could help area governments uncover and then 
successfully prosecute money-launderers and other terrorist financiers. For example, seminars 
organized by the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development 
Assistance and Training (OPDAT) provide training to help participating countries to develop 
action plans to strengthen counterterrorism efforts and draft counterterrorism legislation. Djibouti, 
Kenya and Tanzania have sent representatives to receive training in combating terrorist financing 
from OPDAT. Since capacity and enforcement abilities to combat TF in these countries is 
particularly low (see below), there should be indirect benefit to the efforts of these countries to 
combat TF.  
Conclusion 
Beyond explicit measures to provide assistance to Africa’s security architecture and to fight 
terrorist finance, there are a variety of “security cooperation” tools that in one form or another 
contribute to the War on Terror in Africa. These include the traditional forms of security 
assistance (international military education and training), humanitarian assistance, combined 
training and exercises (such as FLINTLOCK), direct operational activities (peacekeeping, 
humanitarian relief ops, counter-narcotics, etc), combined education, mil-to-mil contact, and other 
DoD activities such as demobilization, civil affairs and environmental security.[30] This article 
attempted to lay out the basic arguments for why the United States is increasingly concerned with 
terrorism in Africa, the true nature of the terrorist and Islamist threat, and to provide a basic 
outline of the major counterterrorism programs currently run by the U.S. government. A truly 
comprehensive approach to combating terrorism on the continent would involve a much broader 
range of programs, focusing on alleviating the conditions that leave Africans vulnerable to 
recruitment in the first place. The U.S. acknowledges this, and has stepped up its HIV/Aids 
programs and development assistance (through the Millennium Challenge Account). Whether or 
not the programs will have tangible results still remains to be seen. The interesting fact is that 
whatever way you cut it, the level of attention and support that African countries are receiving as 
a result of their role in the post 9-11 strategic environment is unprecedented in U.S. foreign policy. 
The views and ideas expressed in this paper are the author’s own; they do not reflect the position 
or policy of the United States government. I would like to thank the Homeland Security Center at 
the Naval Postgraduate School for support to conduct the interviews associated with this project. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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purpose. 
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